The vote of no confidence in Sliema Mayor Nikki Dimech will be taken today. The Times reports that all six remaining Sliema Councillors need to show up in order to ensure that Joanna Gonzi replaces Nikki Dimech as Mayor of the council. The four Labour councillors are expected to abstain on the vote as directed from HQ while Dimech and Camilleri – the two ex PN councillors who resigned from the party are expected to vote against.
Article 29 of Chapter 363 (Local Councils Act)
29. (1) The Mayor or Deputy Mayor shall cease to hold their
office upon a vote of no confidence delivered by a majority of the
Councillors in office.(2) The motion proposing a vote of no confidence in the Mayor
or Deputy Mayor shall be signed by at least one third of the
Councillors in office and shall specify the reason for such motion
and propose another Councillor to be elected as Mayor or Deputy
Mayor as the case may be.
J’accuse chooses “impeachment day” to ask a few questions of the current system. DimechGate (and the ancillary cases involving PL and PN councillors in different localities) have brought to light a few shortcomings of the dealings of political parties at local council level. J’accuse does not intend to advocate against the participation of parties in local politics but rather would like to question what the added value actually is and whether the parties are really providing a service to the various communities by bringing their partisan terms to the local table.
Condizionamento Arbitrale
In dealing with the issue we take a step away from the allegations regarding the police questioning of the current Sliema Mayor in the hope that any doubts raised and alarm bells rung are replied and seen to in the appropriate judicial forum. This is not about an extended conspiracy theory involving some hidden arm of the law directed from some party HQ. We do feel the need to say, however, that police intervention in certain matters might suffer from what in football (at least when it was trendy to bandy conspiracy theories) is referred to as “condizionamento psicologico arbitrale” – and that this does not only apply to PN intervention (vide PBO) but also to sudden trysts of fancy by the PL (vide Anglu Farrugia’s crusade on purchased votes). This condizionamento arbitrale is a symptom but not a cause of the current ails.
Partiti Politici
The role of political parties in local councils was hotly debated from the start. The PN had no qualms in spreading its political participation at local council level. Labour on the other hand took a step back from the first elections and only entered the fray at alater stage. The very notion of a “political party” in the law applicable to Local Councils is interesting. Under Cap 363 – the Local Councils Act – a “political party ” is defined as follows:
“political party” means, except as otherwise provided for in this Act, any person or group of persons contesting the elections of a Local Council as one group bearing the same name (Article 2 – Interpretation)
Unless you take into account the Kafkesque detail of the Third Schedule to the Act (entitled Local Councils (Elections) Regulations, 1993) in which the electoral fetish of us Maltese is reflected in full blasts with such minutiae as the behaviour of Directors of Retirement Homes during election time being regulated and above all – access to every step of the process – from printing to counting – for party agents being guranteedd… unless you register that, parties have little or no mention in the actual political running of councils under the letter of the law.
The most important provision in which parties make a fleeting (but very relevant) appearance is Article 25 dealing with the election of the Mayor:
25 (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of article 29, the office of Mayor in any Local Council shall be occupied by such elected Councillor who at the last local election shall have obtained the highest number of votes in the first count amongst the candidates of the political party which at such elections obtained the absolute majority of Councillors in such Council. Such Councillor shall assume the office of Mayor at the first sitting of the Council after such local election. If for any reason such Councillor refuses to occupy the office of Mayor, the Councillor with the second highest number of votes from the aforesaid political party shall assume office, and so on, until the office of Mayor is filled:
Provided that if the Mayor vacates office during the Council’s term, the office of Mayor shall be occupied by such person belonging to the same political party who had obtained the highest number of votes in the first count after the Mayor who is vacating office:
Provided further that where the law does not provide otherwise, the Mayor shall be chosen from amongst the Councillors.
Peachy innit? Bear in mind that party refers to not just PN, PL or AD but also to any other group of individuals contesting under one name: e.g. Società Filarmonika Hal-Bomba. In a hypothetical vote even if a member of a newly council of five got over half of the first count votes to get elected but the rest of the votes were share equally between another four candidates of one “party” then the new Mayor would not be the independent person who garnered most votes but rather the candidate who has most votes among those elected on the party list.
Strangely, this system does away with the simple vote among councillors to see who among them enjoys the support of the majority of councillors (whatever the colour or creed) as is done (hypothetically) for the selection of Prime Minister in parliament. So essentially a party will vie for an absolute majority of councillors in an election after which it is guaranteed that there will be no “freak vote” whereby its councillors “defect” and vote for a popular “independent” – and boo to self-determination.
The role of parties in the 80 articles of the Local Councils Act starts and stops with the determination of the Mayor. The rest of the Act (particularly the aforementioned Schedule 3) is more concerned with the hobby of thousands that is the electoral process, electoral agents, perspexes and ballot papers. So the law is not exactly illuminating with regards to the interaction between a political party and its elected members within the council.
A che prò?
So why does a councillor like Robert Musumeci “take exception” to calls for parties to get their hands out of Local Councils? What’s the big deal? How is a relative party heavyweight like Secretary General Paul Borg Olivier drawn to risking his and his party’s reputation by attempting to oblige at least one councillor to use her vote against her will in order to obtain the necessary number of votes to get an impeachment of a Mayor going?
The answers are not so easy and we need to step back in order to get a clearer picture. As I said earlier my concern is to discover how parties could be beneficial to a local council and whether they are actually inputting such benefits. The impression right now is simply that while the PLPN are eager to have a finger in every council pie they are only really heard of when distancing themselves from those who fail to perform well. Furthermore there is a distinct impression that there is no nation-wide policy that applies to local councils in similar circumstances.
Faustian reasoning may play the fool with regard to Karol Aquilina and requisitioned houses elsewhere in Malta but Karol’s position on the Siggiewi house sounds very much like a policy that could, and should, be applied elsewhere by members of the same party in the interests of the community. That this does not happen cannot be taken as proof that Aquilina’s move was opportunistic (true) but it definitely paints a picture of a haphazard one-off application that cannot in any way be attributed or equated to the home party unless similar actions are really triggered off elsewhere.
That there is no evidence of a coordinating body within the parties that is used to trigger off local-friendly programmes across different councils is a clear sign of the misuse of the party ticket. For what worth is it to aim to garner as many majorities as possible in the councils of Camillo and Peppone when there is no programme to follow through? The dangers of such wide nets simply for the number are being evidenced now as both PN and PL find themselves burdened with scandals they never bargained for. That such scandals can and will happen is normal – when a sequence of scandals related to mismanagement and mishandling of public resources occurs then we begin to question the preparation of such candidates. Worse still we question whether the culture of curried favours and political obligations is now too well dug in into our council system.
So the first question we pose in this first part is this:
1) If we accept the role of political parties (and not just PLPNAD) in Local Councils how should or could this role be defined? Is this a question for legislators to address (aihmè the PLPN legislators) or is it something that should come from within the parties?
We’ll be back with more.
